Programme
A PDF of the programme can be found here
The conference starts with a reception at 7pm on Sunday 18th September at Matou Pan Asian Restaurant. The talks take place on Monday 19th, Tuesday 20th, and half of Wednesday 21st September 2016 at the Hilton Liverpool City Center. The conference dinner is at 7pm on Tuesday 20th September at the The Racquet Club (map here).
Quick links to the program for: Monday; Tuesday; Wednesday.
7pm Sunday 18th September - Reception at Matou Pan Asian Restaurant
Monday 19th September
09:30-10:30 | Invited talk - A Normalized Value for Information Purchases | Olivier Gossner |
10:30-11:00 | Coffee | |
11:00-11:20 | Logarithmic Query Complexity for Approximate Nash Computation in Large Games | Paul Goldberg, Francisco J. Marmolejo Cossio and Zhiwei Steven Wu |
11:20-11:40 | Lipschitz Continuity and Approximate Equilibria | Argyrios Deligkas, John Fearnley and Paul Spirakis |
11:40-12:00 | The parallel complexity of coloring games | Guillaume Ducoffe |
12:00-12:20 | Complexity and Optimality of the Best Response Algorithm in Random Potential Games | Stéphane Durand and Bruno Gaujal |
12:20-14:00 | Lunch | |
14:00-14:30 | The Big Match in Small Space (BEST PAPER) | Kristoffer Arnsfelt Hansen, Rasmus Ibsen-Jensen and Michal Koucky |
14:30-14:50 | Deciding Maxmin Reachability in Half-Blind Stochastic Games | Edon Kelmendi and Hugo Gimbert |
14:50-15:10 | History-Independent Distributed Multi-Agent Learning | Amos Fiat, Yishay Mansour and Mariano Schain |
15:10-15:30 | On the Robustness of the Approximate Price of Anarchy in Generalized Congestion Games | Vittorio Bilò |
15:30-16:00 | Coffee | |
16:00-16:20 | Efficiency of equilibria in uniform matroid congestion games | Jasper de Jong, Max Klimm and Marc Uetz |
16:20-16:40 | On the Price of Anarchy of Highly Congested Nonatomic Network Games | Riccardo Colini-Baldeschi, Roberto Cominetti and Marco Scarsini |
16:40-17:00 | The Impact of Worst-Case Deviations in Non-Atomic Network Routing Games | Pieter Kleer and Guido Schaefer |
17:00-17:20 | On Selfish Creation of Robust Networks | Ankit Chauhan, Pascal Lenzner, Anna Melnichenko and Martin Münn |
18:00-19:30 | Optional walking tour |
Tuesday 20th September
09:30-10:30 | Invited talk - Linear Fisher Markets with Satiation | Kurt Mehlhorn |
10:30-11:00 | Coffee | |
11:00-11:20 | Dynamic Resource Allocation Games | Guy Avni, Thomas A. Henzinger and Orna Kupferman |
11:20-11:40 | Analyzing Power in Weighted Voting Games With Super-Increasing Weights | Yoram Bachrach, Filmus Yuval, Joel Oren and Yair Zick |
11:40-12:00 | Strong and Weak Acyclicity in Iterative Voting | Reshef Meir |
12:00-12:20 | Stable Matching with Uncertain Linear Preferences | Haris Aziz, Peter Biro, Serge Gaspers, Ronald de Haan, Nicholas Mattei and Baharak Rastegari |
12:20-14:00 | Lunch | |
14:00-14:20 | The Stable Roommates problem with short lists | Ágnes Cseh, Robert W. Irving and David F. Manlove |
14:20-14:40 | The price of stability of simple symmetric fractional hedonic games | Christos Kaklamanis, Panagiotis Kanellopoulos and Konstantinos Papaioannou |
14:40-15:00 | Truthfulness and Approximation with Value-Maximizing Bidders | Salman Fadaei and Martin Bichler |
15:00-15:20 | Envy-Free Revenue Approximation for Asymmetric Buyers with Budgets | Evangelos Markakis and Orestis Telelis |
15:20-15:50 | Coffee | |
15:50-16:10 | SBBA: a Strongly-Budget-Balanced Double-Auction Mechanism | Erel Segal-Halevi, Avinatan Hassidim and Yonatan Aumann |
16:10-16:30 | Revenue Maximization for Market Intermediation with Correlated Priors | Matthias Gerstgrasser, Paul Goldberg and Elias Koutsoupias |
16:30-16:50 | Bribeproof mechanisms for two-values domains | Matúš Mihalák, Paolo Penna and Peter Widmayer |
16:50-17:10 | The Anarchy of Scheduling Without Money | Yiannis Giannakopoulos, Elias Koutsoupias and Maria Kyropoulou |
19:00- | Conference Dinner | The Racquet Club |
Conference dinner
The conference dinner will take place at 7pm on Tuesday at the The Racquet Club.
Wednesday 21st September
09:30-10:30 | Invited talk - Mechanism Design for Learning Agents | Costis Daskalakis |
10:30-11:00 | Coffee | |
11:00-11:20 | An almost ideal coordination mechanism for unrelated machine scheduling | Ioannis Caragiannis and Angelo Fanelli |
11:20-11:40 | Designing cost-sharing methods for Bayesian Games | George Christodoulou, Stefano Leonardi and Alkmini Sgouritsa |
11:40-12:00 | Essential μ-compatible subgames for obtaining a von Neumann-Morgenstern stable set in an assignment game | Keisuke Bando and Yakuma Furusawa |
12:00-12:20 | Repeated multimarket contact with observation errors | Atsushi Iwasaki, Tadashi Sekiguchi, Shun Yamamoto and Makoto Yokoo |
12:20-14:00 | Lunch | |
14:00 | The End |